Turkey

A Tale of Two Currency Crises: A Short Comment

Published by Anonymous (not verified) on Fri, 17/08/2018 - 12:51pm in

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Argentina, Turkey

So the Turkish foreign exchange crisis is all over the news. But the Argentine one is less conspicuous in the international media. Turkey's economy has had many similarities with Latin American economies over the years, in terms of the incomplete process of industrialization, and the types of crises associated with neoliberal reforms over the last three decades. Note, however, that the Argentine nominal depreciation has been larger than the Turkish (the same is true if you go back to the previous big crisis in both countries in the late 1990s and early 2000s, respectively) and one should expect more coverage (perhaps Erdogan has worse press than Macri, but the authoritarian credentials of the latter should not be dismissed; neither the neoliberal ones of the former, I might add).
In all fairness the NYTimes does cite Argentina (and other emerging markets; not a fan of the term, as I think I discussed before on a post about... wait for it... an external crisis in Argentina and Turkey four years ago) in the piece about it today, saying that:

"For nearly 10 years now, the flood of cash from global central banks has financed shopping malls in Istanbul, booming cities in China and 100-year bonds in Argentina. Today, many of the malls are empty, property developers in China are riddled with debt, and Argentina has just submitted to a bailout from the International Monetary Fund."

That seems to suggests that the reason for the crisis is to some extent that central banks created too much liquidity (printed too much money), allowing too much spending (perhaps by the government, wink, wink, nudge, nudge, say no more: it's a fiscal problem), and that's why we are having these problems. However, the NYTimes does get the external problem, the current account, which I always suggest is the way you should go if you are looking for fundamentals (here another discussion from 4 years ago on currency crisis, this one more theoretical). The NYTimes says:

"A country runs a current account deficit if it takes in more money — in investments and trade — from foreigners than it sends to other countries. That leaves the country at the mercy of international investors to keep it afloat financially, and those investors could find other markets more enticing — particularly when emerging markets see their currencies lose value. That is precisely what forced Argentina to go to the I.M.F., the first major emerging market to take such a step during this period of uncertainty."

However, as I noted on my earlier post on the Argentine situation, while I do think that current account positions are the relevant fundamental (the other would be international reserves) for a currency crisis (and that fiscal positions are the result not the cause of a crisis, since they are in domestic currency for the most part), it worth noting that the Turkish situation is not, at least looking at recent data, particularly bad.
Note that there is a secondary axis for the Turkish current account as a share of exports (the right hand side one), and that Turkey has a much larger deficit with respect to exports than Argentina, but not one that is deterioration drastically (these are based on IMF estimates, btw). This suggests that the current account, even though it is crucial in the long run, is probably not driving the crisis (as I noted in May, I still don't the current account is the cause of the crisis; same post as above, btw).

The fact that this is a global phenomenon (the depreciation of currencies of developing countries) suggests that the hike of the interest rate in the US plays a role. It seems also that the financial deregulation and the financial position of some developing countries explain why they are having more trouble than others (e.g. Brazil, which is in the middle of a serious economic and political crisis, but sitting on top of US$ 380 billion in reserves). I haven't found more recent data (this from the World Bank goes only to 2016), but the graph below shows the short-term debt to international reserves ratio; the reverse of the Guidotti-Greenspan rule).
Clearly the ratio has been growing in both countries (mildly in Turkey) and is higher in Argentina. Argentina has also increased its debt exposure in dollars, and somewhat incredibly the central bank has announced that it will retire debt in pesos, and will use precious reserves in dollars for that (apparently with support from the IMF). This suggests that they are clueless about the causes of the crisis. The only solution at this point is higher interest rates (and in domestic currency to reduce demand for dollars) and significant restrictions on the foreign exchange market.

Russia Backs Non-Dollar Trade With Turkey, No Promise Of Help Amid Lira Crisis

Published by Anonymous (not verified) on Thu, 16/08/2018 - 11:00pm in

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Russia, Turkey

“The use of national currencies for mutual trade has for several years been one of the tasks that the presidents of Russia and Turkey had set,” Lavrov told a joint news conference with Cavusoglu in Ankara. “Identical processes have been happening in our relations with Iran. Not only with Turkey and Iran, we’re also arranging and already implementing payments in national currencies with the People’s Republic of China,” he said. “I am confident that the grave abuse of the role of the U.S. dollar as a global reserve currency will result over time in the weakening and demise of its role,” Lavrov said, echoing statements made by President Vladimir Putin. However, Lavrov did not announce any immediate commitment to drop the dollar in trade with Turkey or provide it with financial aid, leaving observers guessing if the two countries, both hit by U.S. sanctions, have agreed on any bilateral deal.

War, Imperialism, and Class Polarization on a Global Scale

Published by Anonymous (not verified) on Sat, 21/07/2018 - 9:17am in

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Adapted from a presentation to the Chicago Convention of the International Marxist-Humanist Organization, July 13, 2018.

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Long Read Review: Turkey’s July 15th Coup: What Happened and Why edited by M. Hakan Yavuz and Bayram Balci

Published by Anonymous (not verified) on Mon, 16/07/2018 - 8:57pm in

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Turkey

Two years after the event, the collection Turkey’s July 15th Coup: What Happened and Why, edited by M. Hakan Yavuz and Bayram Balci, brings together contributors to unpack the historical, political, religious and ideological dimensions of the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey. The volume offers insightful historical insight into the deteriorating relationship between AKP leader and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Gülen movement and its ultimate impact on the events of 15 July 2016, writes Serhun Al.

Turkey’s July 15th Coup: What Happened and Why. M. Hakan Yavuz and Bayram Balci (eds). University of Utah Press. 2018.

Find this book: amazon-logo

Political and cultural institutions of the modern Turkish Republic (established 1923) were mostly built by a small group of political elites with strong military careers under the undisputed leadership of Mustafa Kemal and with the aim of creating a secular and Western-style nation state. This was based on Western modernity as opposed to the Islamic and imperial character of the archaic Ottoman state (1299-1922). Under the secular Republic, Islamic groups mostly became an oppositional community and the competitor against the new state.

Moreover, this new state and nation-building were mostly engineered under and in parallel to the making of a strong and secular Turkish military. Thus, the modern Republic itself is a reflection of a nationalised military and a militarised nation within which the primary duty of all citizens has been to serve, protect and survive the state. The almost-hysterical psychology of the latter is of course an outcome of the traumatic, humiliating and depressing dissolution of the once-glorious Ottoman Empire at the hands of domestic and external destabilising forces.

That is why the Turkish military under the Republic was always determined to prevent a similar catastrophe along with the protection of the Kemalist character of the new state. Within this context, Turkish politics in the second half of the twentieth century was subject to various military interventions and coups (in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997). The communist and Islamic threats were the major factors that led to such interventions. Interestingly, the ultimate goal of the Turkish military was never to be the government itself, but rather to ‘correct’ the civilian government practices that would jeopardise the survival of the nationalist and secular character of the state. Thus, transition to civilian politics after military interventions was always imminent—very different from the military coup culture in Latin America or Africa, for instance. Yet, military tutelage and democratisation in Turkey have still been conflicting forces.

The secular Kemalist establishment first significantly began to shatter with a new hegemonic political actor in Turkish politics after 2002: namely, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a pious Muslim with a political Islam background. AKP came to power by winning elections with a majority vote in 2002 and has remained the single-party government since then with its blend of social conservatism, Islamic piety and economic liberalism.

Behind the scenes, perhaps the most critical ally of Erdoğan in this process was Fethullah Gülen, the self-exiled religious cleric in the US who leads the so-called Hizmet (Service) or Gülen movement, a global Islamic network of education, business and media allegedly dedicated to raising a pious Muslim generation with emphasis on science, Islamic ethics and the market economy. This alliance was mostly based on mutual interests rather than a principled stance against the secular Kemalist establishment across the military, judiciary and other key state institutions. Thanks to this strong alliance, Erdoğan’s rule showed resistance to the 2007 e-memorandum issued by the military against the presidential candidacy of Abdullah Gül, now an ex-comrade of Erdoğan, who also survived a party closure case by the Constitutional Court in 2008 based on charges of religious reactionism. Under the AKP governments, the bureaucracy and state institutions were mostly filled with pro-Gülen cadres who neutralised the secular Kemalist military officers and bureaucrats through the Ergenekon (2007) and Sledgehammer (2010) trials on the basis of alleged coup attempts against the democratically elected Erdoğan government. When one investigates these trials today, it turns out most of the accusations were based on fabricated evidence by pro-Gülen police officers and state prosecutors.

When AKP won the 2011 general elections with almost 50 per cent of the total votes, many believed that this was a victory against the military tutelage and that the era of military coups was over in Turkey. This is perhaps why no one in Turkey was expecting the 15 July military coup attempt in 2016—a traumatising shock to the whole nation. However, the nature of this failed intervention, which led to the death of 272 people, was a completely different story compared to previous Turkish military interventions in the twentieth century. 15 July was the outcome and peak point of a conflict and rivalry between old allies/new foes within the Islamic community itself: namely, Erdoğan and his AKP versus Fethullah Gülen and his so-called Gülen movement.

Image Credit: Anti-coup protesters after 15 July 2016 Turkish coup d’état attempt in Bağcılar, İstanbul, Turkey (Maurice Flesier CC BY SA 4.0)

Turkey’s July 15th Coup: What Happened and Why, edited by M. Hakan Yavuz and Bayram Balci, unpacks the historical, political, religious and ideological dimensions of this coup attempt. It provides a holistic perspective on why, how and under what conditions the relationship between Erdoğan and Gülen transformed from an invisible alliance after 2002 to an all-out conflict from 2013, which ultimately led to the 15 July coup in 2016. Despite skepticism in the international community, editors Yavuz and Balci as well as the contributors all agree without a doubt that 15 July was administered and masterminded by Gülenist circles within the military. Therefore, the book mostly rejects the allegations that 15 July was a ‘Hollywood production’ by Erdoğan to strengthen his grip on power.

In Chapter One, Yavuz explains the transformation of the Gülen movement from a pietistic Muslim community in the 1970s to a movement with global media, education and business networks in the 1990s, before becoming a politically motivated religious-ideological structure in the 2000s aimed at controlling the state. In this regard, Yavuz argues that the police in Turkey became fully under the control of Gülenist circles by 2007 and the judiciary by 2010. Yavuz also reveals how Gülen was mostly distant from other major Islamic groups in Turkey, such as Necmettin Erbakan’s Welfare Party and the National Outlook Movement, for ideological and strategic reasons.

For Yavuz, Gülen is a political strategist who tends to see the Turkish state as being as sacred as Islam and thus perceives and embraces Turkish nationalism as mutually constitutive with an Islamic worldview. This is why Gülen’s pro-state tendencies in the 1990s made him closer to centre-right political parties rather than political Islamist groups such as Erbakan’s that had more anti-establishment and pro-ummah political views. Although Erdoğan was a student of Erbakan and came from the National Outlook tradition, his mutual interests with the Gülen movement — namely, a fear of military persecution and a desire to escape the political pressures of the secular establishment — brought them into a strategic alliance to transform state institutions. However, they were also competing for the same state resources and unwilling to share power with each other. Thus, the clash of Turkey’s two most prevalent Islamic movements was inevitable, Yavuz argues.

In Chapter Two, Mujeeb R. Khan reviews how Gülenist circles gradually infiltrated state institutions in the 2000s. In Chapter Three, Yavuz and Rasim Koc unpack the reasons behind the clash between Erdoğan and Gülen based on their ideological differences. For instance, while Erdoğan and AKP mostly embraced pro-Palestinian and pro-Muslim Brotherhood views along with potential reconciliation with Iran, Gülen has been pro-Israel and anti-Iranian due to the movement’s headquarters being based in the United States. Gülenist policy-making is closer to American neoconservatives and Saudi Wahabis in terms of undermining the anti-Western political Islamist movements in the region, most particularly the Muslim Brotherhood. In fact, if one traces the first dispute between Erdoğan and Gülen, one may point to the Davos incident in 2009, where Erdoğan publicly accused the late Israeli President Shimon Peres of being a murderer of Palestinians. Erdoğan’s open anti-Israeli opposition put the Gülen movement in the United States in a tough spot. After the 9/11 attacks, the Gülen movement was seeking to become the symbol of ‘good Muslims’, Western-friendly and pro-democracy in the eyes of the American bureaucracy and public. Any anti-Western and anti-Israeli move by Erdoğan in Turkey hurt the Gülenists’ desired public image in the West.

Image Credit: Grand National Assembly, Turkey, following 15 July coup attempt, taken in August 2016 during tour by Marine Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (DoD Photo by Navy Petty Officer 2nd Class Dominique A. Pineiro, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Flickr account CC BY 2.0)

In Chapter Five, Kilic Kanat compares and contrasts the military coups and interventions in Turkish politics and argues that what the coup plotters miscalculated on 15 July was the reaction of civilians. In Chapter Six, Caroline Tee analyses the rise and fall of the Turkish-Islamic alliance between the Gülen movement and AKP. While she argues that social conservatism, religious piety and economic liberalism are key common characteristics of the two groups, the Davos incident (2009), the Gaza flotilla raid by Israeli military against the Turkish-owned Mavi Marmara (2010) and the Oslo talks with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) (2012) gradually deteriorated Erdoğan-Gülen relations. Erdoğan’s first retaliation against the Gülen movement was his 2012 move to shut down university preparation schools (dershane), which were the recruiting and indirect indoctrination sites for the Gülenists.

In Chapter Seven, Sabine Dreher argues that the Gülen movement is an elite-oriented religious revival movement that promotes neoliberalism within its own understanding of globalisation based on education in private schools, business networks and intercultural dialogue. But she argues that making Turkey and Turkish Islam the premier of the market economy in the Muslim world has been the main national dimension in the worldview of the movement.

In Chapter Eight, Balci provides a historical account of the Gülen movement’s expansion in the post-Soviet political space, including the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Balci argues that the Turkic nature of these areas contributed to the movement’s choice of operations. After the conflict began between Erdoğan and Gülen, Ankara demanded the abolition of Gülenist activities in many countries in these territories: for instance, Gülenists are criminalised in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, though they are still active in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, according to Balci. In Chapter Nine, David Tittensor analyses the Gülen movement’s relationship with academics in the West and argues that it has tried to promote a pluralist self-image despite its secretive and hierarchical inner organisational structure. Thus, he argues that academics need to be cautious when they study large and powerful organisations in Turkey and elsewhere.

In Chapter Ten, Yavuz Cobanoglu introduces perhaps one of the few studies on the role of women in the Gülen movement. Based on a survey study with women who stay in Gülen dormitories in Tunceli, Cobanoglu reflects on how the movement is inherently patriarchal, hierarchical and authoritarian in nature. Women can be teachers, organisers, fundraisers and elder sisters (abla) in dormitories, but they can never become part of the core decision-making circle at the top of the movement.

In Chapter Eleven, Kristina Dohen analyses the post-coup attempt future of the Gülen movement, with a case study of Gülen schools in Tanzania. She argues that since the activity and image of the movement in Turkey has mostly collapsed, they may have to rely on non-Turkish members for its global survival. To do this, Gülenists may need a revised ideology beyond a Turkish-Islamic synthesis. In Chapter Twelve, Joshua Hendrick argues that the US policy of finding a model of ‘good Islam’ in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks has also led to the expansion and spread of the Gülen movement worldwide.

Overall, this edited volume offers three major arguments. First, the 15 July coup attempt was a Gülenist job. Second, despite the public relations promotion of the movement as a pluralist and democratic organisation, the Gülen movement’s inner circles are highly hierarchical, secretive and patriarchal. Third, the infiltration of the Gülenists in the top cadres of the state institutions in Turkey was mostly encouraged by the AKP governments between 2002 and 2011.

The book offers an insightful historical account of how the Gülen movement and AKP relations evolved from a strategic alliance in the early 2000s toward an all-out-conflict that led the way to the 15 July 2016 coup attempt. Yet, the volume overlooks the theoretical literature on military coups around the world and fails to project under which political, economic and social contexts states may be subject to military interventions. Military coups rarely occur in liberal democracies and free societies. Hence, the book neither really addresses under what conditions this coup attempt would not have occurred nor how Turkey can overcome its historical pattern of military interventions.

The collection also largely neglects the post-15 July political situation in Turkey, where thousands of academics, civil servants, journalists, students, business people and ordinary citizens have lost their jobs and many have been prosecuted with weak due process. Thus, the book does not attend to how the 15 July coup attempt and the democratic defence of Turkish people have not brought the long-desired consolidated Turkish democracy, but have rather led to a persistent state-of-emergency politics along with a culturally and politically divided nation. Turkey now is governed under a newly adopted presidential system (approved as a result of the 16 April 2017 referendum), and Erdoğan has been the popularly elected first president under this new system following the 24 June 2018 national elections. This will be a new test for Turkish politics as to whether the era of military interventions is now bygone and the long-desired democratisation can ever be achieved.

Serhun Al is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Izmir University of Economics, Turkey. His research interests include the politics of identity, ethnic conflict, security studies and social movements within the context of Turkish and Kurdish politics. His recent publications have appeared in journals such as Ethnopolitics, Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, Nationalities Papers, Globalizations, Journal of International Relations and Development and Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies.  He is the co-editor of a recent book entitled Comparative Kurdish Politics in the Middle East: Actors, Ideas, and Interests (Palgrave, 2018).

Note: This review gives the views of the author, and not the position of the LSE Review of Books blog, or of the London School of Economics. 


Turkish-Syrian Border: Confusion, Destruction and Grief

Published by Anonymous (not verified) on Thu, 05/07/2018 - 3:30am in

"One day, true leaders of the world will come, and they’ll cut off all the gas and petrol supplies to you, and you’ll find yourself in even deeper shit than the one into which you are throwing this part of the world! You’ll have to burn your designer clothes and shoes, just to stay warm. You forgot, but you will soon be reminded, Europe: we are all human beings!”

Fresh audio product

Published by Anonymous (not verified) on Fri, 01/06/2018 - 7:11am in

Just added to my radio archive (click on date for link):

May 31, 2018 Kali Akuno of Cooperation Jackson on why black Americans should resist gun control • Sabri Oncu on Turkey—the currency panic, the political and economic troubles

The U.S. won’t say ‘genocide’ but cares about Armenian democracy?

Published by Anonymous (not verified) on Mon, 21/05/2018 - 9:00pm in

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Russia, Turkey

by Max Parry “Did Armenia just dance its way to revolution?” Mass demonstrations that have shut down Armenia leading to the replacement of its prime minister have queued the obligatory western media push for regime change. Already dubbed a ‘Velvet Revolution’ after the 1989 protests that collapsed communist Czechoslovakia, there have been so many ‘color revolutions’ in former Soviet states that the colors are being recycled by the NGOs. The first crowds gathered in April in response to the Republican Party of Armenia’s decision to nominate outgoing leader Serzh Sargsyan as the sole candidate for Prime Minister after having already served as the country’s President since 2008. Despite its constitutional legality, this was perceived by many to be a consolidation of power as he would have retained the same authority since the country just transitioned to a prime ministerial system. Predictably, the western media commentary has framed the protests in the context of the new Cold War by emphasizing the ruling party’s links to ‘Kremlin oligarchs’ and Armenia’s presence within Russia’s sphere of influence. However, …

Do you want to travel around the Middle East? Think twice!

Published by Anonymous (not verified) on Wed, 16/05/2018 - 1:00pm in

Text and Photos by Andre Vltchek Do you think it is that simple to travel around the Middle East? Think twice! Ask Palestinians, about trying to get from a point A to a point B in their own nation. Some time ago, sitting in an old Ottoman hotel in Bethlehem, I asked a waiter what it takes to travel from there to Gaza, where he said, several of his relatives were living. He looked at me as if I had fallen from the Moon: “There is no way I could travel there. If my relatives get very sick or die, then, in theory, I could apply for an Israeli travel permit to go there, but there is absolutely no guarantee that they would approve, or that I could get to Gaza on time…” I tried to appear naïve: “And what if someone from an Arab country which does not recognize Israel, wants to come here, to Bethlehem? Like, a Lebanese pilgrim or just a tourist? Could he or she enter from Jordan?” The waiter weighed …

No to Trump’s, Netanyahu’s, Bin Salman’s Imperialist War Drive Against Iran!

Published by Anonymous (not verified) on Mon, 14/05/2018 - 10:31am in

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ImageFor Iran, the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 Nuclear Agreement will mean crushing sanctions and direct or continued indirect war declared by Israel and Saudi Arabia with U.S. support. For the Middle East, it will mean further destruction and regional imperialist competition. For the world, it will mean further division between the U.S. and the European Union and further global imperialist competition.

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The Racists and Reactionaries Who Are the ‘Honorary Patrons’ of the Campaign Against Anti-Semitism

On Wednesday, Tony Greenstein also put up a very revealing post discussing some of the honorary patrons of the Campaign Against Anti-Semitism. This is the organisation responsible for many of the anti-Semitism smears and libels, including that of Mike. Greenstein notes that it’s suspected of being funded by the Israeli Ministry of Strategic Affairs as part of their campaign of dirty tricks against the Boycott, Divest and Sanction movement. And the CAA’s patrons are a grim lot of reactionaries, racists and islamophobes. They include the former archbishop of Canterbury, George Carey, Eric Pickles, Bob Blackman, Matthew Offord, Mike Freer, and Richard Kemp.

Carey got himself into trouble with Britain’s Muslim community in 2004 with a tactless comment about Islam, which included the words ‘During the past 500 years, critical scholarship has declined, leading to strong resistance to modernity’. It’s a very simplified version of Islamic history, which leaves out Modernists like Mohammed Abduh, the Egyptian ulema, who began the process of modernisation in their country before its conquest by the British and French, and secularist radicals like Turkey’s Kemal Ataturk.

Eric Pickles, whom Buddy Hell at Guy Debord’s Cat has nicknamed ‘the Sontaran’ because of his striking resemblance to those aliens from Dr. Who, used to be progressive and anti-racist. That is before he and Maggie’s Tory cabinet decided to back Ray Honeyford, the headmaster of a Middle School in Bradford. Honeyford had written a piece in the right-wing Salisbury Review, claiming that there was a link between race and intelligence. The local authority wanted to sack him, but he was supported by the Daily Heil and Thatcher. And so Pickles also decided to throw in his lot behind Honeyford. And he’s been a populist ever since.

Blackman, Offord and Freer all put their weight behind the campaign ‘Operation Dharmic Vote’ by the National Council of Hindu Temples back in 2017. This looks like an attempt to copy David Lammy’s Operation Black Vote earlier this century, which was a campaign to get more Black people to vote so that more would be done for them by a more diverse parliament. ‘Operation Dharmic Vote’ sounds similar, but was definitely not as benign. The National Council of Hindu Temples were annoyed that British parties, like Labour, were trying to outlaw caste discrimination, especially against the Dalits. This is the term now used for the Untouchables, the people of the lowest caste, who are given the dirtiest, lowest paid and most demeaning jobs. Indian Dalit activists and writers have described their conditions as ‘slavery’. There are reports in this country of Dalits being refused medical treatment by their doctors. It’s disgraceful, but Blackman, Offord and Freer decided to back the campaign to get the votes of the most reactionary elements of British Hinduism.

Blackman also went further, also hosted a meeting in parliament, at which one of the speakers was Tapan Ghosh, an Indian islamophobe and christophobe. Claiming to be defending human rights, Ghosh talked about ‘800 years of Arab Islamic’ aggression, and ‘200 years of European Christian aggression’. He also described the Rohingyas, now being butchered in Myanmar, as ‘violent’.

Both Islam and Christianity largely entered India through military conquest, though India also has a community of indigenous Syriac Christians in Kerala, who entered the country as refugees from persecution in the Persian Empire. The Hindu Nationalist right bitterly hate Christianity and Islam, as neither religion has a formal caste system like Hinduism. There is a kind of caste system in Indian Islam, but it’s less severe than Hinduism. As a result, many Dalits have converted to Christianity, Islam and Buddhism. The Hindu nationalists have reacted by organising pogroms against Christians and Muslims, as well as Sikhs and extreme right-wing Hindus have carried out forced conversions of Christians. This seems to be the type of Hinduism Ghosh seems to represent, and it’s as racist and intolerant as the militantly extremist forms of the two religions Ghosh denounces.

Then there’s Colonel Richard Kemp, who was successfully sued by Baroness Warsi after he wrote a column in the Jewish News claiming that she was trying to excuse the horror committed by Daesh.

For further details, see Tony Greenstein’s article at http://azvsas.blogspot.co.uk/2018/05/the-campaign-against-anti-semitism_9.html

The Campaign Against Anti-Semitism is the group that’s claiming that since Jeremy Corbyn became head of the Labour party, it’s been infested with anti-Semites. Perhaps there should be an outcry instead on the way it’s supported by very real racists and islamophobes.

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