Yet another New York Times column gets the story on automation and inequality completely wrong

Published by Anonymous (not verified) on Tue, 13/08/2019 - 8:02pm in



from Dean Baker I am a big fan of expanding the welfare state but I am also a big fan of reality-based analysis. For this reason, it’s hard not to be upset over yet another column telling us that the robots are taking all the jobs and that this will lead to massive inequality. The first part […]

Five tax policies for a progressive government

Published by Anonymous (not verified) on Tue, 13/08/2019 - 7:44pm in

In my book ‘The Joy of Tax’ I
argued that tax was the single best instrument available to any government to
shape the society for which it was responsible.

Any incoming progressive government will face massive social challenges. Leaving aside green issues, the biggest of these will be the income and wealth inequality that is crippling our society and leaving many in poverty. The policies that I recommend here are all designed to tackle this issue. That is because I do believe that tax has to be seen as an instrument of social policy.

1. Equalise capital gains and income tax rates

It is quite extraordinary that those with wealth, and who do as a result make capital gains, pay lower rates of tax on those unearned gains than those who have to work for a living pay on their incomes. It is even more extraordinary that those with capital gains get a second annual tax-free allowance over and above that allowance that they, and others, can offset against their earned income. This situation has to change. There are two ways to do this, and both are easy to introduce. The first is to equalise the rates at which income and capital gains are paid by a person. This last happened under Tory governments in the 1980s and 1990s. The second is to substantially reduce the annual capital gains tax allowance. A sum of £2,000 is suggested instead of the current £12,000. This remains more generous than that offered in most countries.

2. Make the UK main corporation tax rate 25% with a small company rate 20%

The current UK corporation tax rate is 19%. It is planned to reduce to 17% in 2020. This rate is well below the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and European Union averages, which are both around 25%. It is also less than the basic income tax rate of 20%. This low tax rate creates a number of perverse incentives. First, it encourages the diversion of any income into a company to save tax. No tax system should undermine itself in this way. Secondly, it encourages increasing wealth inequality as those with wealth can let it accumulate at low tax rates. Third, it reduces the impact of fiscal policy as tax incentives and allowances have limited value. Most importantly though, there is no evidence that the reduction in UK corporation tax rates has encouraged investment or job creation, and business appears unenthused by such low rates. A main corporation tax rate at the OECD average does then make sense. If it was thought necessary, a small company rate set at the same rate as the basic rate of income tax would help remove many incentives to tax avoidance.

3. Cap pension tax relief contributions at 20%

Tax reliefs for pensions cost in excess of £50 billion a year. It is unlikely that almost any new investment in UK business or other economic activity arises as a result. This cost is, then, simply a subsidy to saving, most of which is given to those who are already wealthy or high earners. Pension tax reliefs also create a perverse distortion. Since they are usually provided at a taxpayer’s highest marginal income tax rate many higher rate taxpayers get twice as much tax relief for each pound that they pay into their pension as does a basic rate taxpayer. This double rate of subsidy serves to increase income and wealth inequality in the UK. The problem can very easily be solved: tax relief on pension contributions should only be available at the basic income tax rate in future.

4. Introduce an investment income surcharge

Another perversity of the UK tax system is that those who work for a living tend to have much higher tax rates than those who live off unearned income. This is largely because those who work for a living have to pay national insurance contributions in addition to income tax and those who have unearned income do not do so. Despite this, those with unearned income do have access to the full range of state services and might even qualify for some benefits if, for example, their income fell in old age. This system is then another contribution to the creation of income and wealth inequality in the UK. It can easily be addressed. Until well into the 1980s the UK had what was called an ‘investment income surcharge’ rate of income tax. This charged an additional 15% income tax on investment income and rents over a specified annual allowance, which could be significantly increased for those of pensionable age, but might otherwise apply to income in excess of £12,000 per annum, which limit would imply that the taxpayer to whom it would apply had considerable wealth holdings.

5. Reducing the rate of national insurance for those on low earnings

Those on low earnings in the UK
face very high marginal rates of tax because of the interaction of the income tax,
national insurance and benefits systems, whichever version might apply to them.
There is no easy answer to this problem, but one option that would help would
be to apply a lower rate of national insurance to the first £10,000 of earnings
subject to national insurance. National insurance is payable on earnings over
£6,136 per annum in 2019/20, which is less than half the level at which income
tax starts to be charged. The usual rate charged is 12%. If this was reduced to
4% for the first £5,000 of earnings and to 8% for the next £5,000 then it is
likely that a valuable, if small, contribution to solving this problem would be
made, and a clear political message would be delivered.

There are, of course, a multitude of other tax reforms that could be offered. Those noted do however share a point in common: each is clearly linked to the creation of a more just society, and that is a fundamental role of tax in our society. 

Photo credit: Flickr / Klovovi

The post Five tax policies for a progressive government appeared first on The Progressive Economy Forum.

Some tips on writing about student loans

Published by Anonymous (not verified) on Tue, 13/08/2019 - 7:43pm in



Student loans are complex and confusing. The design is now flawed as a result of a series of piecemeal decisions and the cost is too high for many and is too opaque.

But those pronouncing on loans need to avoid adding to the confusion and in particular need to avoid leaving listeners and readers with the impression that alternative options or early repayment are necessarily cheaper. For a small minority, they might be (but see below). But if you have money to spare, then look to pay rent, before tuition fees.

Some tips for writing about post-2012 student loans:

  1. Don’t talk about interest rates in isolation. They interact with repayment thresholds and write-off policies.
  2. Explain the interest rate taper. The top rate of 5.4% from September will only apply to those earning over £47,835pa (it’s not £41,000). Those earning below £26,576 face interest of 2.4%.
  3. Don’t compare student loans with commercial loans without giving full detail. Include reference to the built-in insurance for death and disability. In the case of a bad accident to a former student, student loans can be written off; a new mortgage that paid the tuition fees upfront won’t be.
  4. Always write:  “Interest accrues”. Whether it will be repaid is a different matter and depends on lifetime earnings of the borrower.
  5. Explain the design behind the real rate of interest (even though it is flawed). The real rate of interest is there to keep higher earners repaying for longer. But only high earners will repay any of that interest. This is a design feature.
  6. Be clear on what a high earner is likely to earn – give an example. How many recent graduates earn over £26,576? What professions are they in?
  7. Emphasise that the “debt burden” from student loans is primarily repayments. Repeat that interest accruing is unlikely to be repaid.
  8.  Always set out the differences facing men and women. Use a chart like this one from London Economics.
    London Economics 2019 baselineOver 70% of women are projected to repay significantly less than they borrowed and almost 40% are expected to repay nothing. Paying upfront is a big gamble for women and making additional voluntary repayments make simply mean repaying more, if you are not likely to clear your balance.
  9. Bear in mind that your listener or reader is very unlikely to have an idea of where they might sit in the deciles for estimated lifetime earnings. They are likely to overestimate their expected position.
  10. Use figures that adjust for the time value of money. Use government figures or figures from a respected outfit like London Economics or Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  11. Don’t use out of date figures or research. The repayment threshold was raised from £21,000 to £25,000pa two years ago and has increased annually since (it will be £26,575pa from April 2020). This reduces everyone’s mandatory repayments and gives more protection to low earners. It also made the scheme more expensive for government.
  12. Explain how it is that the government expects to lose money — almost 50p per £1 lent — even though the interest rates are what they are.
  13. If you must use the government figures for interest accruing, explain that this is a “fiscal illusion” (OBR). The government has been booking interest as income even though it may never be paid.
    These figures will change shortly when the new ONS conventions come in.
  14. Think carefully about what you’ve written. You don’t want to lead people into making bad financial decisions; for example, you don’t want to leave them with the impression that commercial borrowing is cheaper.

Open thread August 13, 2019

Published by Anonymous (not verified) on Tue, 13/08/2019 - 7:00pm in



Bolsonaro despreza os nordestinos. E ele não está sozinho.

Published by Anonymous (not verified) on Tue, 13/08/2019 - 1:03pm in



Brazil's right-wing presidential candidate for the Social Liberal Party (PSL) Jair Bolsonaro gestures during a press conference in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil on October 11, 2018. - The far-right frontrunner to be Brazil's next president, Jair Bolsonaro, stumbled Wednesday by spooking previously supportive investors, while a spate of violent incidents pointed to deep polarization caused by the election race. (Photo by Mauro Pimentel / AFP)        (Photo credit should read MAURO PIMENTEL/AFP/Getty Images)

Foto: Mauro Pimentel/AFP/Getty Images

Qualquer pessoa que saia do Nordeste para a parte de baixo do mapa sente a força do preconceito regional. Nós também sentimos. “O povo do Nordeste é preguiçoso, só vive na rede”, “O que essa pessoa lá do Nordeste quer se metendo nas coisas daqui?” etc. Quantas vezes não ouvimos conhecidos usarem as derivações de “baiano” para expressar algo errado, ruim ou inapropriado, e ficamos constrangidos ao perceber que, indiretamente, era de nós que eles estavam falando.

É por isso que as declarações xenófobas de Bolsonaro não nos surpreendem. Ele só reforça a realidade que conhecemos bem: existe um forte e arraigado preconceito regional no Brasil. Não há diferença alguma entre o que Bolsonaro diz e o que qualquer tio do pavê falaria em um churrasco de domingo. Preconceitos, não esqueçamos disso, que Bolsonaro também destila contra mulheres, negros, LGBTs, indígenas, pobres.

A diferença é que Bolsonaro é o presidente da República, e seus preconceitos interferem na economia e no desenvolvimento do Brasil e, claro, do Nordeste, que já vê o crédito minguar. Um levantamento do Estadão revelou que a Caixa Econômica Federal já reduziu a concessão de novos empréstimos para o Nordeste neste ano. Até julho, os estados da região receberam apenas 2,2% do total de novos empréstimos autorizados pelo banco, um percentual muito menor do que os 21,6% em 2018 e do que os 18,6% em 2017.

Bolsonaro também ignorou dados do Tesouro Nacional, alegando que o baixo volume de financiamentos se deve à alta inadimplência dos municípios nordestinos. Mas as informações do Tesouro provam que não há diferenças regionais nos débitos e nem impedimento legal para que os repasses ocorram.

A explicação verdadeira pode ser outra. Em um evento recente na Bahia, Bolsonaro condicionou a liberação de recursos ao apoio dos governadores do Nordeste: “não vou negar nada para esses Estados, mas se eles quiserem realmente que isso tudo seja atendido, eles vão ter que falar que estão trabalhando com o presidente Jair Bolsonaro.”

Bolsonaro nunca engoliu o fato de que, se dependesse do Nordeste, ele não estaria no Palácio do Planalto.

Quando o presidente deixa evidente o preconceito que tem pelos nordestinos, a mensagem que está passando é que, no seu governo, a população de nove estados do Brasil será ignorada. Não só ignorada, como punida. Ao dizer para o seu ministro que “tem que ter nada com esse cara”, referindo-se ao governador do Maranhão, chamado pejorativamente de paraíba, o presidente está falando de uma parte dos brasileiros que será tratada com desprezo.

Presidente da República, Jair Bolsonaro, durante a 25ª Reunião do  Conselho Deliberativo da Superintendência de Desenvolvimento do Nordeste (SUDENE).

Presidente da República, Jair Bolsonaro, durante a 25ª Reunião do Conselho Deliberativo da Superintendência de Desenvolvimento do Nordeste, a Sudene.

Foto: Marcos Corrêa/PR

Fim de um ciclo

O governo Bolsonaro não é adepto das pesquisas científicas e, com frequência, nega a história. Mas ambas mostram que muitos fatores atrapalharam a ascensão dos nordestinos na economia brasileira. O principal, do passado até hoje, é a falta de políticas públicas de educação, saúde e alimentação.

Foi a partir da segunda metade do século 19 que o fosso regional começou a se abrir. E se mantém largo desde então. Em 2010, a renda média do Nordeste equivalia a 55% da renda sudestina. Mas isso não tem nada a ver com a alegada preguiça dos nordestinos de trabalhar. A questão é econômica.

Em meados da primeira metade do século 19, açúcar e algodão, produtos tradicionais da economia nordestina, iam perdendo fôlego. Na década de 1820, eles respondiam por 50% do valor das exportações brasileiras, mas desabaram para 9% em 1890. Surgia, então, o café como principal produto de exportação do Brasil. Produzido principalmente no Rio, Minas e São Paulo, mas atingindo também o Paraná e o Espírito Santo, o café responderia de 50% a até 70% de todo o valor das exportações brasileiras de 1830 até 1960.

A segunda metade do século 19 marca também o aumento no fluxo de mercadorias, capitais e trabalhadores por todo o mundo. É quando ocorre a segunda revolução industrial, que transformou de forma profunda os transportes, as comunicações e a produção. Com a pujança do café, a região sudeste atrairia a maior parte dos frutos dessa modernização que se dirigiam ao país.

Mas a coisa não se deu de forma repentina. Em 1872, o Rio de Janeiro era a maior cidade do Brasil, com 275 mil habitantes. Em seguida, vinham Salvador e Recife, com 120 mil habitantes, aproximadamente. São Paulo, por outro lado, tinha apenas 31 mil habitantes, sendo menor que São Luís, Fortaleza e Cuiabá. Isso mudou após cerca de três décadas. Em 1900, as duas maiores cidades do Brasil eram Rio, com 811 mil, e São Paulo, com 240 mil pessoas. Consolidava-se, assim, o poderio econômico da região sudeste, e o fosso regional começava a se alargar com maior velocidade.

A explicação para o aumento súbito da população de São Paulo é a imigração europeia, atraída por causa da economia em expansão. Entre 1884 e 1940, desembarcaram no Brasil milhões de italianos e portugueses e milhares de espanhóis, japoneses e alemães. Todos países mais avançados que o Brasil.

Dotados de maior grau de educação (ou “capital humano”, no linguajar dos economistas), essa mão de obra mais qualificada foi crucial para o desenvolvimento do sul e do sudeste do Brasil. Não que houvesse algo de especial nos genes de italianos e alemães. Mas em 1900, enquanto a taxa de alfabetização no Brasil era de 35% da população maior de 15 anos, na Itália era de mais de 50%, e na Alemanha, de quase 80%.

Com o Nordeste em decadência, e com o Sul e o Sudeste em expansão, esses imigrantes – e seus descendentes, com o próprio presidente Jair Bolsonaro, de ascendência italiana – ainda hoje se concentram nas duas regiões mais ricas.

Segundo o censo de 2010, 78% da região sul e 55% da região sudeste se declarava branca, enquanto no Nordeste esse valor é de 29%. Já os pardos – isto é, os mestiços – são 60% dos nordestinos, 36% dos sudestinos e 16% dos sulistas.

Manchete “Nordeste tem novas ‘espécies humanas'”, referindo-se à baixíssima estatura dos nordestinos que passaram fome.

Racismo científico

Desde do final do século 19 estava na moda aquilo que ficou conhecido como “racismo científico”. Isso é, um conjunto de teorias que pregavam a existência de um ranking entre as “raças”, com os brancos europeus ocupando o topo da pirâmide, enquanto as populações pretas e mestiças ocupavam a base.

Brancos europeus são vistos pela sociedade racista da época como mais inteligentes e mais trabalhadores. Os não brancos (pretos, pardos, indígenas), por sua vez, como inferiores, preguiçosos, malandros. Havia até autores como o italiano Cesare Lombroso que davam estofo “científico” às ideias de que pretos e pardos eram inclinados ao crime.

Esses preconceitos facilitavam a ascensão social dos europeus e de seus descendentes, enquanto criavam mais obstáculos para a superação da pobreza das populações não brancas. Logo, o sul-sudeste passa a ser composto em sua maioria pelas “raças superiores”, enquanto os nordestinos, em sua maioria, eram formados por elementos decaídos na visão da elite brasileira.

A decadência do Nordeste era ainda mais violenta para as populações do semi-árido, cuja economia havia se especializado na produção de carne para atender as cidades litorâneas. Já no início do século 19, essa atividade entra em declínio, incapaz de competir com o charque (carne salgada) produzido pelo Rio Grande do Sul. Além dessa queda estrutural, o sertanejo era atingido pelas secas periódicas.

Imagem de uma criança faminta na seca de 1877.

Imagem de uma criança faminta na seca de 1877.

Em 1877 e 1879, ocorre a chamada “grande seca”, que atinge com violência particular o estado do Ceará, provocando a morte de 500 mil sertanejos. Muitos foram os que, ao tentarem fugir da fome, se retiravam para as cidades litorâneas, bem como para a região norte do país, que começava a experimentar o boom da borracha.

Rodolpho Theóphilo em sua “História da seca no Ceará” relata como os retirantes comiam plantas e raízes venenosas, que lhes custavam a vida, como também faziam uso de “carnes repugnantes de cães, gatos, morcegos, répteis e urubus”.

Essa massa de gente esfomeada e doente, que esmolava, se prostituía e cometia pequenos crimes nas cidades – muitas vezes para não morrer – passa a ser vista com pavor também pelas gentes das cidades grandes do Nordeste. Na seca de 1915, no Ceará, chegou-se mesmo a criar verdadeiros campos de concentração de retirantes, buscando evitar que eles chegassem à capital Fortaleza.

De 1950 até 1980, por conta do forte crescimento econômico do Sudeste, legiões de nordestinos saem em busca de uma vida melhor no Rio e em São Paulo. Após longas viagens em caminhões pau-de-arara, esses nordestinos pobres, mestiços, com baixa escolaridade (a maioria era mesmo analfabeta) encontravam sustento em profissões de baixa qualificação e reduzido prestígio social. As mulheres, via de regra, se tornavam empregadas domésticas, lavadeiras. Os homens, pedreiros, trabalhadores braçais.


Cearenses comem lagarto para não morrer de fome.

Arquivo Jornal do Brasil

Sem salários que lhes garantissem dignidade, esses nordestinos iam morar nas favelas que se agigantavam pelas grandes cidades brasileiras. Com pouca educação formal, falando um português com um sotaque característico, passam a ser um alvo fácil do preconceito, do ódio e também do humor – um modo socialmente palatável de destilar xenofobia e ódio.

O preconceito já foi até mais ostensivo e desavergonhado, como nos tempos em que não havia preocupação com o “politicamente correto”, que tanto irrita nosso presidente e nossos humoristas medíocres.

Paulo Francis, por exemplo, vez por outra saudado como um grande jornalista brasileiro, em colunas publicadas em grandes jornais sentia-se confortável o bastante para comparar os nordestinos a uma “sub-raça”. Eugênio Gudin, dos mais respeitados economistas no Brasil, também escrevia no jornal O Globo comparando os sertanejos nordestinos a animais, intocados pela civilização.

Hoje não cai bem escrever essas coisas n’O Globo ou na Folha de S. Paulo, mas no mundo sem leis da internet o preconceito contra nordestinos sempre ressurge. Nas eleições presidenciais, por exemplo, a polarização sul antipetista e norte petista fez ebulir o ódio aos nordestinos.

O presidente Jair Bolsonaro, da posição privilegiada do mais alto cargo da República, está constantemente reafirmando e chancelando a xenofobia, mais ou menos evidente, que existe em parte não desprezível de seu eleitorado. Ele consolida um preconceito baseado nessa construção histórica, de origem econômica, social e racial, que são marca do “racismo científico” e que ainda hoje se mantém no inconsciente de muita gente.

Nós, nordestinos, não somos indivíduos aos olhos do presidente – aos olhos de vários brasileiros também não.

The post Bolsonaro despreza os nordestinos. E ele não está sozinho. appeared first on The Intercept.

Dismantling and devolving the pernicious union

Published by Anonymous (not verified) on Tue, 13/08/2019 - 5:16am in



In recent blog posts, I have been advancing ideas that respond to the frightending dysfunction in the UK polity.

1.  Separation of Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales into individual, independent countries embedded into the EU, and England levered to tether itself as a non member in name only, or rejoining at some point.

2.  Membership of the euro and aspects of the ‘ever closer political union’ that the UK has thus far been exempted from.

Using the same logic, regional devolution would help achieve and accentuate the same ends.

I am not a fan of regional devolution.  Devolving tax raising and spending powers impairs risk sharing and risks municipal corruption and cronyism.  I am not convinced that regions are better placed to trade-off whatever special insight they have into their local problems with the aggregate national interest in the supply of public goods.  But anything that can tame the powers of the mal-functioning national parties and executive has to be a good thing.

In the limit, chop the country up into entirely independent regions and have them embedded in the EU.  The break-up of the union would still leave a relatively empowered England able to do harm to its neighbours and itself.  [England has about 56m of the 66m population of the UK].  Dismembered into North, Central and South East and Cornwall, and the consequential parochialism in their politics reducing their collective heft, less harm would be done.

None of these regions would support a nuclear deterrant or a significant standing army.  All would be dependent on the wider European and NATO structures.  The pressure to submit to the rules of the single market for each of the constituent regions would be very great.  Perhaps every 50 years something like the nationalist virus that has infected the UK would take hold of one of the regions, putting it in conflict, or perhaps even for periods outside the EU.  But this would be of much less consequence, affecting fewer people, and much harder to sustain.  With greatly reduced power would come a reduced level of responsibility that the lowest decile of politicians by capability – who are are currently seeing fill the great offices of state and the Opposition – could live up to.

These things I guess are not going to happen, and, borrowing David Cameron’s old insult aimed at UKIP, you might think me a ‘fruitcake’ for proposing them.

On the applicability of statistics in social sciences

Published by Anonymous (not verified) on Tue, 13/08/2019 - 1:51am in



from Lars Syll Eminent statistician David Salsburg is rightfully very critical of the way social scientists — including economists and econometricians — uncritically and without arguments have come to simply assume that they can apply probability distributions from statistical theory on their own area of research: We assume there is an abstract space of elementary […]

Brexit: the mutually inconsistent views of the desirable anchor and the stormy constitutional sea

Published by Anonymous (not verified) on Mon, 12/08/2019 - 11:07pm in



One feature of Brexit from the perspective of those who see political and economic benefits to remaining a member of the EU is that there is no safe, perpetual compromise position.

There are soft versions of Brexit in which almost all the economic benefits of membership are reaped [for example by remaining in the single market and customs union].  But once we leave it becomes much easier to take further steps away from the EU, and the UK’s economic trading relations, regulatory environment and even to an extent political rights become unethered and more subject to the ebbs and flows of domestic politics.

For Remainers, EU membership is an economic and constitutional anchor;  anything short of this is casting off.

Some Leavers saw things exactly the other way round, of course.

They either feared, or manufactured fears of Good Ship UK Political and Social Norms being dragged by an ever more powerful EU polity, itself a changing entity with the potential for new members to accede.  Membership of the euro, an EU army, EU wide budgets, funding for future bailouts;  obligations to take some of those who migrate into the EU.

For these leavers, rightly or wrongly [in fact wrongly], Brexit was the anchor and continued membership was casting off.

This is at least part of the reason why the issue is so divisive and intractable.

The give and take of technology : Changes in U.S. imports and exports of intellectual property

Published by Anonymous (not verified) on Mon, 12/08/2019 - 11:00pm in



The U.S. creates many technological innovations that the rest of the world wants to use. The FRED graph above tracks how much technology the U.S. exported to the rest of the world from 2002 to 2018 (blue line), as measured by payments the world made for the use of U.S. intellectual property (IP). These payments, in the form of royalties and licensing fees, increased from $67 billion to about $118 billion, showing that the U.S. has substantially increased the knowledge it shares globally.

The U.S. also seeks out technology it doesn’t produce at home. So our graph also displays what the U.S. imported from the rest of the world (red line), as measured by the royalty payments the U.S. made to all other countries for the use of their IP. Take care to connect the exports with the left axis and the imports with the right axis, and you can see that the U.S. transfers much more knowledge than it receives from the rest of the world. But the graph also reveals some finer points.

  1. During the Great Recession of 2008-09, real U.S. exports of IP decreased slightly but real U.S. imports of IP kept increasing. In fact, the U.S. has been on a largely continuous trajectory of technology imports, even during periods when its technology exports have declined.
  2. The U.S. has imported IP from the rest of the world at a faster pace than it has exported it. During 2002-2018, real royalties from U.S. technology exports increased by 75%, but real royalties from U.S. technology imports increased by 113%. The last four years of the sample are largely responsible for this faster pace: Since 2015, royalties from U.S. technology imports have grown by 30%, considerably faster than the -2.5% rate for exports.

So, is foreign technology increasing its contribution to U.S. innovation?

Data from the OECD provide some highlights: The main contributors of technology transfer to the U.S. are the European Union and Japan, accounting for 45% and 21% of payments, respectively, in 2017. Although a much smaller contributor, China has increased its technology transfer to the U.S. In 2002, China’s share of U.S. royalties for foreign IP was 0.1%; by 2017, its share had increased to almost 2%—which could be an indication China will become one of the leaders in global innovation and knowledge sharing.

How this graph was created: Search for and select the annual series “Real exports of services: Royalties and license fees”; from the “Edit Graph” panel, use the “Add Line” option to search for and select the annual series “Real imports of services: Royalties and license fees.” In the “Format” tab, for Line 2, click “Right” under the “Y-Axis position” label to shift its y-axis to the right side of the graph.

Suggested by Makenzie Peake and Ana Maria Santacreu.

Market oriented solutions to the problem of too many guns

Published by Anonymous (not verified) on Mon, 12/08/2019 - 4:21am in



There are too many guns in the USA. If you don’t agree, no need to bother reading on. The market oriented solution is obvious, has no Constitutional problems, and is simple. 1) tax gun production and imports. They don’t grow on trees. A tax of $ 5000 per gun would be useful. Better a higher […]