In 2007 the Australian Labor Party, under Kevin Rudd, inflicted a painful defeat on the COALition. From 60 MPs the ALP had before the federal election, their Lower House representation swelled to 83 (more than enough to pass legislation). And 22 of those new MPs were replacing defeated COALition MPs, whose House contingent was reduced to 65.
To make things worse for the COALition, even John Howard, until then PM, lost his safe seat of Bennelong and “moderate” Malcolm Turnbull, who soon was chosen federal Opposition Leader, was facing an extreme Right insurgency, led by Tony Abbott and Nick Minchin.
In the Senate, things were only slightly less favourable for Rudd, the new Labor PM:
Why the difference in results? Because in Australia, normally only half the Senate seats are contested each election. So, perhaps Labor could have done much better in the Senate, but only half its seats were in dispute. (It would have taken a double dissolution for all Parliament seats to be contested).
At any event, the 32 Labor senators were not enough to outvote the 37-strong COALition contingent. Indeed, the COALition could afford losing a vote, so as to have the Presidency of the Senate (which went to Alan Ferguson).
Of course, as a Left-of-centre party, Labor had a certain affinity with the Greens and the 5 Greens senators (plus perhaps a crossbencher) was all Rudd needed to pass legislation.
Similar arrangements are not without precedent in Australia. In fact, something similar has worked for both the Liberal Party of Australia and the National Party for decades. It’s a matter of political horse trading.
Managers of parliamentary business, as Aussie parties in government have, handle those negotiations. In 2007 that affinity, plus Rudd’s openly pro-climate change action stance, one would have thought, would have made their job easy.
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One would have been mistaken. On climate action, from the very start, the negotiations suffered from a series of problems (much of the blame has been placed on Kevin Rudd and his allegedly troublesome personality).
From my perspective (and I am not alone), a big problem was that instead of calling the Greens, Rudd decided to court the Liberals.[*]
Why?
I can only guess, but I see two not mutually exclusive motivations.
The first one is that Liberal internal divisions presented a temptation Rudd proved incapable to resist. While Abbott and his denialists wanted nothing with climate action, Turnbull and the Liberal “moderates” were inclined to it: Rudd wanted to “wedge” the Liberal Party.
The Labor proposal was called “Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme” (CPRS). It was based on an emission tradings scheme, which, by definition, involves trading financial instruments: what’s there for a bloke like Turnbull not to like? (Remember: Rudd used to call Turnbull the “Member for Goldman Sachs” – by mere coincidence, Josh Fraudenberg, another “moderate”, just got a job there).
There were plenty carrots available: it was just a matter of putting forward a package that slowed GHGs reductions and over-compensated emitters to attract “moderates” and appease business lobbies.
The stick was a threat to call a double dissolution, which could have brought a reduced COALition presence in the Senate.
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A second possibility is that Liberal support, Rudd genuinely hoped, would have acted as a kind of “Abbott insurance”: after supporting the CPRS as opposition in parliament, the Liberals in government would never repeal it, surely?
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Whatever Rudd’s calculations, “bipartisanship” (there’s a reason to use “bi”: it means “two” neither tri- nor multi- partisanship) became his goal. This was to be a Lab/Lib affair. The Greens weren’t welcome (as a matter of fact, Xenophon, by no means a Leftist, wasn’t either).
And as concession after concession was made in a vain attempt to make the CPRS palatable to all Libs and their puppet-masters, Rudd’s climate action became less and less effective.
A sample of that: Treasury modelling in 2008 predicted that the more ambitious (therefore, less politically feasible) CPRS-15 scenario would have reduced emissions from 580 Mt CO2-e to 529 … by 2020: a reduction of 8% on the 2008 emissions level. And that counting purchase of international abatement!
And the thing is, that miserable performance was better than what the other scenario, more likely, offered: CPRS-5 implied not a reduction on emissions by 2020, but their stabilisation at the level of 585 Mt CO2-e, with a fall expected only later in the century (international abatement also included).
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Not surprisingly, many were unimpressed, the Greens among them. What most seem to forget is that disappointment did not make the Greens turn their backs on the Government or on the CPRS:
“In 2008, 11 bills were rejected compared with 159 passed; in 2009, there were 15 rejected and 136 passed; and in 2010 only three—all hangovers from 2009—were rejected and 114 passed.” (see here)Bob Brown, Greens leader at the time, may have many virtues and merits. His attitude towards workers wasn’t one of them. Moreover, it’s not that he wasn’t a socialist, is that he was more of an anti-socialist. (I’d say pretty much the same of Christine Milne and Richard Di Natale, btw). But even I have to give him this: the guy did try to reach out to Labor. Call Brown what you will, obstructionist he wasn’t.
Rudd and Penny Wong (then federal Minister for Climate Change) made a point of rejecting Brown’s overtures. Why? Your guess is as good as mine: in Australia a party like the Greens is considered far Left and there’s nothing a Labor politician fears more than being called a “far Leftist”. (Ask “moderate” National MP Darren Chester, whom today was fretting on TV about Anthony Albanese moving too far to the Left … for making the ABCC less capable of starting witch hunts against the CFMEU).
Tim Hollo was an adviser to Christine Milne at the time. These are his memories of the night of December 2nd, 2009, when the CPRS Bill was defeated for the second time in the Senate.
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In essence, Rudd’s climate policy was dead. Its death contributed to Rudd’s Government’s own demise.
People frequently remember Rudd’s claim about climate change being a great moral problem and the way he turned his back on that. What people don’t remember at all is the enormous irony in these words:
“We should be at a stage in this country where climate change is beyond politics”.
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Anthony Albanese, by the way, was one of Labor’s managers of parliamentarian business.
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If Rudd wanted to wedge the Liberals, he succeeded. But he might have been too clever by half: in Abbott he met more than a match. Turnbull’s downfall inaugurated the fall of the so-called “moderate” faction of the COALition.
The Greens have actually largely been blamed for that fiasco. But are they really to blame for that? Labor say yes (so does John Howard: his party apparently had nothing to do with that, funny that, uh?) and deny their Bill was crap. It’s far from clear, to me.
Should the Greens have supported the CPRS Bill, if not for its real usefulness, for its symbolic value? The Greens say no. While acknowledging all the CPRS deficiencies and the problems with the way Labor approached the negotiations, Adam Simpson (University of South Australia) thinks “perhaps the Greens should have just passed the bill.”
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I trust the similarity between that episode and today’s situation is obvious.
Not much is known about the Climate Change Bill Labor is proposing. Judging by what little has transpired, it seems a largely symbolic piece of legislation. Apparently, it does not contemplate penalties for breaking the law.
What is certainly known is that today, like back then, Labor’s negotiating approach is “take it or leave it”.
Katharine Murphy thinks the Greens and independent Senator David Pocock should take it, in spite of all that. I am trying to be open-minded, but I can’t see much point in that.
NOTE:
[*] I forgot to mention that PM Rudd’s attempts to gain the goodwill of the COALition may have included his decision - most unusual in Aussie politics - to appoint former high-ranking members of the Howard Cabinet to cushy jobs overseas - for which they were almost to the last man unqualified. That’s how Joe Hockey - of all people! - found himself appointed Ambassador to Washington, Amanda Vanstone was sent to Rome and His Lordship, Alexander Downer, Viscount of Adelaide, was sent as High Commissioner to London. Jobs for the mates indeed.
Off the top of my mind, the only exception was Peter Costello who wanted really badly to be IMF boss and Rudd didn’t move a finger to help him. Man, everybody hated Costello!