Theory of Science & Methodology

Created
Sun, 25/05/2025 - 03:02
. Last week, yours truly was invited by the Department of Criminology at Malmö University to deliver a lecture to fellow researchers on recent theoretical developments in causality modelling. Following the presentation, one key question emerged: How can the potential outcomes approach be effectively evaluated within the social sciences? Framing all causal questions as questions […]
Created
Thu, 29/05/2025 - 18:52
Andrew Ross has drawn an analogy between the hierarchical taste cultures (high, middlebrow and popular) familiar to cultural critics, and the demarcation between science and pseudoscience. At a sociological level this is an incisive observation; but at an ontological and epistemological level it is simply mad … Such epistemological agnosticism simply won’t suffice, at least […]
Created
Thu, 24/04/2025 - 20:20
There are other sleights of hand that cause economists problems. In their quest for statistical “identification” of a causal effect, economists often have to resort to techniques that answer either a narrower or a somewhat different version of the question that motivated the research. Results from randomized social experiments carried out in particular regions of, […]
Created
Tue, 19/11/2024 - 21:23
Yours truly har under några år hållit i en kurs för forskare på Malmö universitet kring kausalitet. Den som är intresserad kan ta del av kursens powerpoint här: Kausalitet — en crash course Många frågeställningar inom samhällsvetenskapen idag handlar i grunden om frågor angående kausalitet. Vad ligger bakom den ökade arbetslösheten? Vilka effekter har friskolorna […]
Created
Tue, 01/10/2024 - 00:58
In the potential outcomes approach to causality, sex and race are often not considered causes since they do not fit within this counterfactual manipulation/intervention framework of causal inference. Sex and race cannot be directly manipulated or intervened on, which is said to make it difficult to conceptualize what the ‘potential outcomes’ would be for individuals […]