Reading
"At just 587,000 words, Tolstoy refuses to provide even the most basic information"
The post Peter Dutton’s Review of War & Peace: “Needs More detail” appeared first on The Shovel.
One question for David Krakauer, an evolutionary theorist and president of the Santa Fe Institute for complexity science.
The post Does GPT-4 Really Understand What We’re Saying? appeared first on Nautilus.
Senior figures have warned that a tilt at the leadership is possible if she continues down her current path
The post Moira Deeming Narrowly Avoids Promotion appeared first on The Shovel.
Pope Francis: Ukraine war is “fueled by imperial interests of several empires.”
The post Blake Fleetwood: No Question, Ukraine Is Now America’s War appeared first on scheerpost.com.
Morale hazard can turn into a darker ‘moral’ hazard
Our current banking crisis -- and our government’s responsibility for and response to it -- underscore risks facing citizens and taxpayers backing up our banking system.
Government programs like deposit insurance and the Fed’s role as lender of last resort have been sold as “stabilization” schemes. But we are learning again some unlearned lessons from the past. Those lessons relate to two of the most important words in finance -- moral hazard.
Insured parties may take more risk, once they are insured. This isn’t necessarily immoral, just rational behavior reacting to the fact that they have insurance.
But at some point, ‘morale’ hazard can become ‘moral’ hazard, particularly if depositors and other creditors of banks are protected by the government and the public purse. Protected parties and their friends in high places may become willfully blind to downside consequences imposed on others, and use the government as a vehicle for gain for well-connected insiders while losses are socialized.

There needs to be a safe place for businesses to place their reserves and working capital
There are five main causes of the SVB collapse and the subsequent knock-on problems facing the US and global financial system: the Federal Reserve’s anti-inflation obsession causing it to raise interest rates too high and too fast; the inherent fragility of banking which for centuries has periodically erupted in crises; inadequate regulation of this fragile system which often leads to high profits that accrue to bankers’ and their wealthy owners; the corruption and self-dealing that often result from banks’ insufficient supervision; and the lack of public alternatives for financial institutions and services that could perform many of the key functions of banking and finance with less risk and without the private financiers taking their cut. Some of the huge profits the financiers make from this system are funneled back to buy support from the politicians to prevent adequate regulation, and to secure bail-outs when the system crashes.
Featuring articles by James B. Thomson and Walker F. Todd, Claudia Sahm, Gerald Epstein, Ronnie J. Phillips, Anastasia Nesvetailova, Gerald P. O’Driscoll, Jr., William Bergman, and Thomas Ferguson
After a bitter and bruising election contest, Humza Yousaf has won the Scottish National Party’s (SNP) leadership and become Scotland’s First Minister. His victory over his nearest rival, Kate Forbes, was far from convincing. Yousaf won 48.2 percent first preference votes to Forbes’ 40.7 percent. As neither candidate gained over 50 percent, the second preferences […]
There is a banking crisis. Again. Banking regulators were asleep at the switch. Again.
The present crisis is not a replay of 2007-08, which was centered around housing. In that crisis, lenders took on too much credit risk. Additionally, financial institutions relied on exotic financial products to protects, such as derivatives, to protect against risk. The products failed to do so. Lawmakers and regulators reacted by placing new constraints on credit risk.
Thomas Hoenig, former President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City and former Vice-Chairman of the FDIC, argues that “Another Banking Crisis was Predictable.” In response to the last banking crisis, the Fed’s risk models were focused on credit risk, while Silicon Valley Bank’s portfolio was heavily exposed to interest-rate (“duration”) risk. Once the Fed began hiking interest rates, the value of SVBs assets began falling.
A federal government guarantee or 100% reserve banking? Which is better?
Not long after arriving to teach economics at Colorado State University nearly four decades ago, I was introduced to a retired economist living in Fort Collins who had a simple idea for solving the problem of bank runs: require banks to have the cash on hand whenever the depositor wished to withdraw. Lloyd W. Mints had been one of the founders of the Chicago School of Economics along with Henry Simons and Frank Knight. The proposal, which has a history going back to at least the early 19th century, has variously been called 100% reserves, full reserve banking, or the Chicago Plan for Banking Reform.